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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon this Court 
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1986), and Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(i)(10). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Dunn's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that 
Mr. Dunn, an indigent, could have raised his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal when the same 
court-appointed attorney who rendered ineffective assistance 
at trial also ineffectively represented Mr. Dunn on his direct 
appeal? 
2. Was Mr. Dunn denied effective assistance of counsel 
on his direct appeal when his court-appointed counsel filed 
an Anders brief which inadequately presented the meritorious 
issues it did raise and completely failed to raise several 
other meritorious issues? 
3. Was Mr. Dunn denied effective assistance of counsel 
at trial? 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy, presiding, dismissing appellant Robert W. 
Dunn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Judge Murphy 
summarily dismissed the petition on the ground that all of 
the issues raised by the petition could e^ nd should have been 
raised on the direct appeal from Mr. Dunn's conviction in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, of 
second degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Copies of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I^ aw and the Order of 
Dismissal, dated January 12, 1988, are attached hereto as 
Addenda A and B. 
Mr. Dunn seeks a reversal of Judge Murphy's decision on 
the ground that he should not be precluded from raising the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time 
on a petition for writ of habeas corpus when the court-
appointed attorney who represented him at trial also repre-
sented him on his direct appeal, and where counsel's repre-
sentation both at trial and on the direct appeal was ineffec-
tive. Mr. Dunn's conviction should be reversed and he should 
be granted a new trial because he received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel in violation of his right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. In the alter-
2 
native, Mr. Dunn's petition for writ of habeas corpus should 
be remanded to the Third District Court for an evidentiary 
hearing and determination of whether he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Statement of the Facts 
The Direct Appeal 
On January 5, 1981, after a four-day jury trial on 
charges of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping, 
appellant Robert W. Dunn was convicted of second degree mur-
der under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1978), a first degree 
felony, and aggravated kidnapping under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-302 (1978), then a capital felony,1 for which he received 
concurrent sentences of five years to life and life imprison-
ment. Trial Ct. File, pp. 119, 169. Marcus Taylor, an 
attorney appointed by the court, had represented Mr. Dunn, 
an indigent, at trial. .Id. at 8. 
On January 9, 1981, Mr. Taylor wrote Mr. Dunn and ad-
vised him not to appeal from his conviction. Third District 
Ct. File, pp. 137-39. This advice was based upon the 
erroneous opinion that, were he granted a new trial, Mr. Dunn 
would risk being convicted of and sentenced to death for two 
capital offenses.2 Mr. Taylor's letter did not advise Mr. 
Aggravated kidnapping was reduced to a first degree felony 
by a 1983 amendment. 
2Mr. Taylor's advice was contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
405 (1978), which prohibits a court from imposing a more severe 
sentence for the same conduct when a conviction or sentence has 
been set aside on direct review or collateral attack. See also 
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Dunn that there were no non-frivolous grounds for an appeal. 
Despite Mr. Taylor's advice, Mr. Dunn insisted upon ap-
pealing from his conviction. In response, Mr. Taylor moved 
this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel on the ground 
that there were no non-frivolous issues to be raised on ap-
peal. Mr. Taylor filed an Anders brief (a copy of which is 
attached as Addendum C) which raised the issues of (1) 
whether the trial court had erred in denying Mr. Dunn's mo-
tion for a change of venue, (2) whether the trial court had 
erred in receiving in evidence a photograph of the victim, 
(3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the con-
viction, and (4) whether the trial court had erred in re-
ceiving in evidence bullets allegedly found in Mr. Dunn's 
personal belongings. 
Dissatisfied with his counsel's brief, Mr. Dunn filed 
a pro se brief on appeal. In his brief, Mr. Dunn attempted 
to argue the issues of lack of probable cause for his arrest, 
illegal search and seizure and insufficiency of the evidence. 
A copy of the pro se brief is attached as Addendum D. On 
May 3, 1982, this Court granted Mr. Taylor's motion to with-
draw and affirmed Mr. Dunn's conviction. State v. Dunn, 646 
P.2d 709 (Utah 1982) (per curiam). 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980). 
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The Arrest and Search 
On August 14, 1980, the Utah Highway Patrol receiyed a 
telephone call from a hitchhiker who reported that he had 
seen a man pounding on the rear window from inside the back 
of a motorhome as it pulled away from a service station in 
Richfield, Utah. Shortly afterward, UHP Trooper Bud Larsen 
stopped a vehicle fitting the description given by the hitch-
hiker. The vehicle was being driven by Mr. Dunn. Transcript 
of Preliminary Hearing3, pp. 230, 243. After Trooper Larsen 
came to the driver's side of the motorhome, Howard Scott 
appeared from inside the back of the motorhome and sat in the 
front passenger seat. P. 232; Trial Transcript,4 p. 442. 
After requesting and receiving Mr. Dunn's driver's license, 
Trooper Larsen asked for the vehicle registration. P. 231-
33. Both Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott searched briefly for the 
registration, but were unable to produce it. T. 262. Salina 
City Chief of Police Gordon Kiesel arrived and Trooper Larsen 
asked Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott to exit the vehicle. Tom 
Jenson, an off-duty Salina City Police Officer, then arrived 
and Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were ordered to kneel down next 
to a fence facing away from the road. While Trooper Larsen 
went to search the rear of the motorhome (P. 235-37), Officer 
Jenson and Chief Kiesel guarded Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott with 
3Cited hereinafter as "P. 
4Cited hereinafter as "T. 
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a sawed-off shotgun. P. 237-38, 256-57. 
Trooper Larsen entered the vehicle. P. 223. He opened 
the bathroom door and found the body of a recently deceased 
man who had been shot. P. 225. Exiting the motorhome, 
Trooper Larsen asked Mr. Dunn, "What can you tell me about 
the man that's in the motorhome?" P. 238. Mr. Dunn replied, 
"I want an attorney. All I was told was to drive." P. 238-
39. 
Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were immediately arrested, sub-
jected to a pat-down search and handcuffed. P. 240. There-
after, Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were transported to jail, P. 
262, and the motorhome was placed into storage. T. 289. 
At the jail, Mr. Dunn advised Deputy Sheriff Clyde Page 
that he had a medical condition and asked him to retrieve his 
prescription medicine from his duffel bag which had been left 
in the motorhome. T. 279-80. Mr. Dunn described the bag as 
a yellow duffel bag with some shoes tied on it, T. 283, and 
stated that his medicine would be found in the bottom of the 
bag. P. 121. Deputy Page informed Mr. Dunn that a search 
of the motorhome would be conducted the next day and that he 
would get Mr. Dunn's medicine then. T. 280. 
The next day, a warrant was obtained for a search of the 
motorhome and an extensive, six-hour search of the motorhome 
and its contents was conducted. A yej-low duffel bag was 
found in the rear of the motorhome, but was not opened or 
searched at that time. T. 280-81. Instead, because it was 
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getting late and he believed he had the right to search any-
thing found in the motorhome, Deputy Page brought the bag to 
the jail. T. 280, 284. There, he searched the duffel bag 
in the presence of Sheriff Rex Huntsman and Sevier County 
Attorney R. Don Brown. T. 280-84. At the very top of the 
duffel bag, Deputy Page found a blue bag with a zipper clo-
sure which he described as a "bank bag." T. 296. The blue 
bag contained some toilet articles and a small red bag closed 
with a drawstring. T. 296. Upon opening the red bag, Deputy 
Page found ten to fifteen unspent 25-calibre bullets. T. 
296; P. 121-23. Near the bottom of the bag, Deputy Page 
found several vials of prescription medicine bearing Mr. 
Dunn's name. T. 283. 
The Trial 
Mr. Dunn was tried in the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding. Before trial, defense 
counsel moved to exclude from evidence a police photograph 
of the victim's bloody corpse stuffed into the bathroom of 
the motorhome. Defense counsel argued the photograph was 
inflammatory and unnecessary because the fact of the homicide 
was uncontested. T. 227. Indeed, the State did not contend 
that Mr. Dunn either physically struck the victim or fired 
the pistol killing the victim. T. 230, 305. An autopsy 
report and another photograph of the body were admitted into 
evidence at trial pursuant to stipulation. T. 320-21. The 
trial court denied the motion and the photograph was received 
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in evidence at trial. T. 227-28. 
Defense counsel also moved before trial to exclude Mr. 
Dunn's 1973 felony conviction for assault with a deadly wea-
pon. Trial Ct. File, p. 94. The trial court ruled the prior 
conviction inadmissible except to impeach or rebut character 
evidence offered by the defense. T. 236-37. In reliance on 
that ruling, Mr. Dunn testified in his own defense at trial 
without putting his character in issue. T. 388-445. After 
Mr. Dunn had testified on direct, the State moved to admit 
the prior conviction and the court reversed its pretrial 
ruling. T. 444, 447. On cross-examination, Mr. Dunn was 
required to testify not only that he had been convicted of 
the felony charge, but also that the crime involved the 
abduction of a girl. T. 447. 
Except for the testimony of Howard Scott, the admitted 
triggerman, the evidence adduced against Mr. Dunn at trial 
was entirely circumstantial. Scott had obtained a hung jury 
at his own trial two weeks before. T. 498. He then gave a 
recorded statement about the crime and pled guilty to second 
degree murder in exchange for his testimony against Mr. Dunn. 
T. 519. At Mr. Dunn's trial, Scott was called by the State 
only on rebuttal. T. 491. He testified that Mr. Dunn wanted 
to rob Sprinkle, and that they both tied Sprinkle up and put 
him in the motorhome. T. 493. He claimed he hit Sprinkle 
on the head and shot him, using a gun Mr. Dunn had removed 
from his duffle bag, only because Mr. Dunn had told him to. 
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T. 492-94. 
On cross examination, Scott denied having entered the 
plea bargain and claimed to have no recollection of the re-
corded statement. T. 498, 509. The State elicited testimony 
on redirect that Scott was a diagnosed pathological liar. 
T. 510. The prosecutor then impeached his own witness by 
taking the stand on surrebuttal to establish the existence 
and terms of Scott's guilty plea and the contents of the 
recorded statement. T. 518-19. Both the recorded statement 
and Scott's trial testimony were inconsistent with several 
prior statements Scott had made about the crime which 
exculpated Mr. Dunn. T. 309-315, 395-96, 481-83, 497-510. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Scott 
"would tell a lie any time to make him look good."5 T. 556. 
Aside from Scott's testimony, the only direct evidence 
about the crime was the testimony of Mr. Dunn himself. Mr. 
Dunn testified as follows: In early August 1980, Mr. Dunn 
was hitchhiking to Texas from his home in San Francisco to 
visit his mother and seek employment. T. 398-99. In 
Barstow, California, Ernest Sprinkle stopped his motorhome 
and offered Mr. Dunn a ride to Las Vegas. T. 401-02. 
Sprinkle also agreed to give Scott, and a third hitchhiker 
named Pete, a ride. T. 402-03. 
5Scott's testimony was arguably so inherently unbelievable 
that reasonable minds could not rely on it to convict Mr. Dunn 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 762 
(Utah 1979); State v. Middlestadt, 579 P.2d 908, 911 (Utah 1978). 
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Scott was quiet during the ride, rarely saying anything 
except to himself• T. 403. Sprinkle stopped once at a gas 
station to buy a six-pack of beer, and again at a small town 
just south of Las Vegas, where he went into a casino and gam-
bled for an hour. T. 404. 
The four men arrived in Las Vegas just before dark on 
August 13, 1980. T. 405. There, the hitchhikers removed 
their belongings from the motorhome and the four men went 
their separate ways. T. 405-08. Occasionally, however, Mr. 
Dunn, Scott and Sprinkle, ran into each other in various cas-
inos. T. 407-08. Sprinkle was playing "21" and drinking 
heavily. T. 409. Throughout the night he would give Mr. 
Dunn and Scott small amounts of money for gambling and buying 
drinks. T. 404, 407, 409-11, 470. Around 11:00 p.m., 
Sprinkle offered Mr. Dunn and Scott a ride to Colorado. T. 
411. 
About five miles outside of Las Vegas, Sprinkle pulled 
over and asked first Scott (who declined because he did not 
have a driver's license), and then Mr. Dunn, to drive. Mr. 
Dunn agreed to drive because Sprinkle had been weaving on the 
road. T. 413-14. When they reached Mesquite, Nevada, they 
again stopped at a casino. T. 415. Sprinkle went straight 
to the gambling tables and continued to drink and play "21". 
Mr. Dunn had breakfast in the casino cafe. Scott joined 
Sprinkle in gambling, and would sometimes steal poker chips 
from Sprinkle, cashing them in and pocketing the money. T. 
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419-20. 
They left Mesquite at daybreak, with Mr. Dunn driving 
because Sprinkle was in no condition to drive. At one point, 
Sprinkle went into the back and laid down on the floor and 
Scott sat in the passenger's seat. Mr. Dunn tried to strike 
up a conversation with Scott, but Scott kept mostly to him-
self. After they had travelled a while, Scott went into the 
back and, without saying a word, hit Sprinkle over the head. 
Sprinkle jumped up and said, "Don't hurt me and I'll give you 
anything you want." Pointing a gun, which Mr. Dunn had never 
seen before, at Sprinkle's head, Scott ordered Sprinkle to 
shut up or he would blow his head off. Scott also ordered 
Mr. Dunn to keep quiet. Frightened, Mr. Dunn continued to 
drive. Scott tied Sprinkle's wrists together and put him in 
the bathroom. T. 422-27. 
When they reached Richfield, Utah, Scott ordered Mr. 
Dunn to pull into an Amoco station to buy a fuse for the CB 
radio. T. 431. Scott was holding the gun in his hand as 
they pulled into the station, and, while there, Scott would 
not let Mr. Dunn out of his reach. T. 432-34. At Scott's 
orders, Mr. Dunn bought the fuse and tried to install it. 
He was shaking with fear and trying to install the fuse when 
he heard a noise in the back. T. 435. He turned his head 
and saw Sprinkle coming out of the bathroom. T. 435-36. 
Scott ran for Sprinkle, again forcing him into the bathroom 
and yelled, "Get this damn thing out of here." T. 436. 
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Scared, Mr. Dunn pulled out of the station, almost colliding 
with a truck. Mr. Dunn heard noises and shouting in the back 
of the motorhome, but could not see all that was going on. 
T. 437-38. A couple of miles down the road, he heard the gun 
go off. T. 438. Several times during the above episode, 
Scott had threatened Mr. Dunn with the gun. Thinking for 
sure he was next, Mr. Dunn drove slowly through the town 
deliberately missing the 1-70 turnoff and hoping to catch 
someone's attention. T. 438-441. A short while later, the 
motorhome was stopped by the police. Mr. Dunn felt relieved 
when the officer ordered him to step out of the vehicle. T. 
443. 
Most of the remaining evidence adduced at trial was con-
sistent with Mr. Dunn's defense of coercion. The strongest 
contrary evidence was the discovery of the unspent bullets 
in Mr. Dunn's duffle bag. T. 296; P. 121-23. The trial 
court denied defense counsel's pretrial motion to exclude 
this evidence. T. 238, 285-86. Other evidence showed that 
the gun belonged to Scott and that Scott may have stashed the 
bag of bullets in Mr. Dunn's duffle bag just prior to the 
arrest. T. 268, 295-97, 319, 344, 345-46, 374-75. 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor made reference 
to Mr. Dunn's request for counsel at the arrest scene. T. 
575. The prosecutor used this remark to infer guilt on the 
part of Mr. Dunn, and to disparage his defense of coercion 
and duress. M . The State also argued to the jury that they 
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should consider societal concern and outrage regarding the 
crime in deciding Mr. Dunn's guilt or innocence, T. 549, and 
referred to pretrial publicity surrounding the case and the 
fact that the victim did not have twelve jurors to decide 
whether he should live or die. T. 548. 
Defense counsel did not request, nor did the court give, 
any jury instruction regarding uncorroborated accomplice 
testimony. While the court did give a jury instruction on 
accomplice liability, the instruction given did not set forth 
the necessary elements for a finding of accomplice liability. 
Trial Ct. File, p. 316. A copy of Jury Instruction No. 17 
is included as Addendum E. Similarly, the court gave an 
instruction on Mr. Dunn's defense of compulsion, but the 
instruction was improper because it did not state the 
prosecution has the burden to prove the absence of evidence 
supporting the affirmative defense. Trial Ct. File, p. 150. 
A copy of Jury Instruction No. 30 is included as Addendum F. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Dunn's constitutional rights to effective assistance 
of counsel at trial and on direct appeal were violated. The 
same court-appointed counsel who represented him at trial 
also filed an Anders brief on Mr. Dunn's direct appeal. 
Counsel's performance on appeal was constitutionally defec-
tive because the Anders brief inadequately presented the 
issues it did raise, and it failed to raise several other 
substantial, meritorious issues, including that same coun-
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sel's ineffective assistance at trial. Counsel's trial per-
formance also failed to meet minimum standards of competence 
because, among other things, counsel failed to request sev-
eral critical jury instructions. 
Mr. Dunn was actually prejudiced by counsel's deficienc-
ies because there is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence that the outcome of the trial or the direct appeal 
would have been the same had counsel performed at the level 
required by the Constitution. 
Given the deficiencies of counsel' s performance at trial 
and on direct appeal, the district court erred in dismissing 
Mr. Dunn's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is fun-
damentally unfair and unconstitutional to invoke the direct 
appeal rule to deny collateral relief when the same counsel 
who inadequately represented an indigent defendant at trial 
also inadequately and perfunctorily represented him on direct 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DISMISSING MR. 
DUNN'S HABEAS CORPUS PETITION RAISING THE CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Generally, issues that were or could have been raised 
on direct appeal from a conviction are not subject to col-
lateral review on a habeas corpus petition. See Boggess v. 
Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 
2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968). This Court, however, 
has recognized exceptions to this general rule. 
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[H]owsoever desireable it may be to ad-
here to the rules, the law should not be 
so blind and unreasoning that where an 
injustice has resulted the victim should 
be without remedy• For that reason, ... 
the writ should be available in rare 
cases, where it appears that there is a 
strong likelihood that there has been 
such unfairness, or failure to accord 
due process of law, that it would be 
wholly unconscionable not to examine the 
conviction. 
Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979); see also 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, 
J. concurring). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is an "unusual cir-
cumstance" that justifies, and indeed mandates, collateral 
review. See Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 
968, 969 (1968). In Codianna, in response to the petition-
er's argument that his counsel's inexperience and unfamil-
iarity with controlling law justified his failure to raise 
certain issues on appeal, this Court stated, "If counsel's 
deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to deprive petition-
er of the effective assistance of counsel, they constituted 
a violation of due process that is clearly reviewable on 
appeal or by post-conviction review." 660 P.2d at 1105. 
The Court declined to review four issues raised for the 
first time by habeas corpus petition, but only after thor-
oughly reviewing the performance of the petitioner's counsel 
and finding it constitutionally sufficient. Although the 
Court found deficiencies in trial counsel's performance, in 
15 
light of "highly incriminating evidence" against the peti-
tioner , the Court found no prejudice as a result of the 
deficiencies. Id. at 1113. But cf. Hafen v. Morris,, 632 
P.2d 875 (Utah 1981). 
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court also recognized 
that " [ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause for 
a procedural default." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 
(1986). In Murray, the Court held that counsel's ignorance 
or inadvertent error with respect to a particular issue does 
not satisfy the "cause-and-prejudice" requirement for fed-
eral habeas review of an issue not raised on appeal. Never-
theless, the Court stated that "if the procedural default is 
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth 
Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the de-
fault be imputed to the State, which may not fconduc[t] 
trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend 
themselves without adequate legal assistance.1" ^d. (quot-
ing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)). The Court 
noted that the right of effective assistance of counsel is 
a "safeguard against miscarriages of justice in criminal 
cases" which "may in a particular case be violated by even 
an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently 
egregious and prejudicial." 477 U.S. at 496 (citing United 
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n. 20 (1984), and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-96 (1984)). The 
Murray Court further acknowledged that the right to effec-
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tive assistance of counsel applies on an appeal as of right. 
The Court reversed the lower court's ruling, however, be-
cause the petitioner had "disavowed any claim that counsel's 
performance on appeal was so deficient as to make out an in-
effective assistance claim." 477 U.S. at 497. 
Here, Mr. Dunn received ineffective assistance of coun-
sel not only at trial, but also on direct appeal. Although 
proceeding pro se, in arguing his petition to the district 
court Mr. Dunn expressed his dissatisfaction with his coun-
sel's performance on appeal: 
THE COURT: The court needs to make a 
determination, and that's what I want to 
know today is what is it or why is it 
that you could not present the issues 
that you are raising in your petition 
for writ of certiorari [sic], why you 
could not have presented those in your 
direct appeal. 
MR. DUNN: My attorney took a lot of 
heat for the case which was presented at 
trial, and he filed a motion to withdraw 
at the time that my appeal was due. And 
he didn't want anything to do with it. 
He wanted to back out of it. He wanted 
to file a motion to withdraw, leaving me 
hanging and leaving me without suffi-
cient resources to pursue my appeal or 
any issues I had. 
I have brought that to the attention of 
one motion I will submit to the Supreme 
Court that I have been attempting to try 
and bring issues to the court, which I 
was not able to adequately pursue an 
appeal. I am not a lawyer, and I don't 
have a law library. It is just totally 
inconceivable for me to come into one of 
these courtrooms and represent and pur-
sue a case. 
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Habeas Corpus Proceedings, December 28, 1987 Hearing, Tr. at 
4-5; see also Th^rd District Ct. File, p. 3, Vir 4(b)(2) and 
4(c)(3), p. 134 1Mr 5-9, p. 144-45 M 1(1). As more fully 
discussed in Point II,A below, counsel's performance on 
appeal fell far below the minimum acceptable level of com-
petency. In filing a motion to withdraw and an Anders 
brief, appellate counsel asserted that there were no non-
frivolous issues to raise on appeal. In fact, an indepen-
dent review of Mr. Dunn's trial transcript reveals numerous 
issues worthy of briefing and argument. Many of these 
issues were ignored completely; others were treated in an 
inadequate, perfunctory fashion in the Anders brief. 
Among the issues Mr. Dunn's counsel failed to raise on 
appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. An 
attorney may not be expected to raise on appeal the issue of 
his or her own ineffective assistance at trial and, there-
fore, the failure to do so does not preclude the defendant 
from raising the issue in a habeas proceeding. Wiley v. 
State, 517 So.2d 1373, 1378 (Miss. 1987); Bear v. State, 417 
N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa App. 1987); People v. Ford, 99 111. 
App. 3d 973, 426 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1981); State v. Hunt, 338 
A.2d 95, 100 (Md. App. 1975). Thus, even if counsel's re-
presentation of Mr. Dunn on appeal were not otherwise inef-
fective, his failure to raise the issue of ineffective 
assistance at trial should not preclude Mr. Dunn from rais-
ing that issue in a habeas proceeding. 
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At the hearing below on the State's motion to dismiss 
the petition, rather than focusing upon Mr. Dunn's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court focused upon 
the pro se brief submitted by Mr. Dunn. 
THE COURT: You did make a filing in the 
Supreme Court on your appeal, though, 
right? 
MR DUNN: My attorney, when he filed, 
he had filed a notice continuously, 
month after month for a year, saying he 
didn't have the time to pursue it; his 
case load was too large, he can't ade-
quately pursue the transcripts to find 
anything, and I just want to withdraw 
from the case and let him have the op-
portunity to try and get counsel or take 
it to federal court, leaving me just 
hanging. 
THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, my question is: 
You filed something with the Supreme 
Court on your direct appeal? 
MR. DUNN: I didn't know what else to 
do. I just drew it up on a piece of 
paper and submitted it to the Supreme 
Court. 
THE COURT: And when you did that, you 
had the same feelings towards your law-
yer that you have now? 
MR. DUNN: He was inaccurate. He should 
have brought issues up. 
THE COURT: And did you, in your filing 
with the Supreme Court, indicate to them 
at that time that your counsel, Mr. 
Taylor, was incompetent? 
MR. DUNN: I tried to bring it to their 
attention, they apparently overlooked it 
or I, myself, didn't write it in the 
paperwork. But me trying to handle 
something like that is like me trying to 
go up to an eight-year old boy and hand-
ing him a case and say, "Take it to 
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trial." 
THE COURT: Has your ability changed 
since then? Because it is clear to me 
you are raising that issue. 
MR. DUNN: [non-responsive answer]. 
December 28, 1987 Hearing, Tr. at 5-6. 
Mr. Dunn's pro se brief to this Court did not make an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Under the district 
court's reasoning, Mr. Dunn was precluded from raising the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by habeas peti-
tion precisely because he was finally able to communicate to 
the district court that he was raising such a claim. This 
reasoning unfairly vests Mr. Dunn with the skills, abilities 
and training of a competent lawyer and places him in a 
double-bind or "Catch-22" from which there is no escape. It 
cannot reasonably be contended that Mr. Dunn had the know-
ledge or skill necessary adequately to raise the ineffec-
tiveness of counsel claim or the other issues his counsel 
failed to raise on his direct appeal. A review of his pro 
se brief, Addendum D, confirms that Mr. Dunn was severely 
hampered on appeal by the lack of adequate legal assistance. 
The right to effective assistance of counsel applies 
not only at trial but also on appeal. Evitts v. Lacey, 469 
U.S. 387 (1985); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 497. It 
is unreasonable and fundamentally unfair to charge Mr. Dunn 
with the ability to identify any but the most blatant errors 
in the criminal proceedings against him. Obviously, some 
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degree of legal knowledge is prerequisite to judging an 
attorney's performance. The deficiencies in the performance 
of Mr. Dunn's counsel identified in this brief, such as the 
failure to request appropriate jury instructions (Point 
II, B, below), the failure adequately to argue the search and 
seizure issue (Point II,A,2,c, below), and the failure to 
raise the prosecutor's improper closing argument (Point 
II,A,2,b, below), are not of a nature an uneducated lay 
person such as Mr. Dunn6 could be expected to recognize or 
adequately present. State v. Hunt, 338 A.2d 95, 97 (Md. 
App. 1975) (the failure to identify and object to errors by 
relatively uneducated defendant not waiver of effective 
assistance of counsel). Mr. Dunn expressed his dissatisfac-
tion with his attorney by filing a brief pro se after his 
attorney had ostensibly already submitted a brief on his 
behalf. However, having not been explicitly expressed, Mr. 
Dunn's ineffective assistance complaint was unrecognized by 
this Court. That Mr. Dunn was able nearly eight years after 
his appeal finally to articulate his complaint in a manner 
cognizable by the courts should not now work to his preju-
dice.7 
6Mr. Dunn completed only the 10th grade and estimates his 
reading ability as only "fair." Transcript of Proceedings [on 
Arraignment] (November 17, 1980), p.3. 
7In fact, Mr. Dunn's pro se habeas petition was drafted with 
legal assistance provided by the Utah State Prison under contract 
with a law firm. December 28, 1987 Hearing, Tr. at 3. Because 
prisoners are appointed counsel to represent them on their direct 
appeals, the prison contract attorneys do not provide legal 
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Based upon a review of the record of Mr, Dunn's trial 
and appeal, this brief demonstrates that Mr. Dunn was denied 
effective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct 
appeal. A new trial is therefore required. If, however, 
this Court should conclude that the record does not conclu-
sively demonstrate the denial of Mr. Dunn's constitutional 
rights, this Court should remand Mr. Dunn's habeas petition 
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on matters 
outside the record.8 
II. MR. DUNN WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
BOTH AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL 
The constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel9 en-
compasses the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
not only at trial, but also on a defendant's first appeal as 
of right. Evitts v. Lacey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). In State v. 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987), this Court, adopting 
assistance for such appeals, although assistance is available to 
prisoners on habeas corpus petitions. There was no law library at 
the prison at the time Mr. Dunn drafted his pro se brief. Thus, 
as a matter of fact, Mr. Dunn's ability to raise the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is greater now than it was in 
1980 when his appeal was taken. 
8The district court dismissed the petition without acting on 
Mr. Dunn's motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(i)(5). If this Court remands the petition to the Third 
District Court, it should also direct that counsel be appointed. 
9Art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees an accused's 
right to counsel. The Utah provision guarantees as much protection 
as the Sixth Amendment, and possibly more. The Utah Constitution 
provides an independent basis for the relief requested here. 
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the standards set forth in Strickland, held that a party 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must demon-
strate: 
[First] that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by 
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defen-
dant must show that the deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counself s errors 
were so serious as to deprive the de-
fendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687. 
As we show below, Mr. Dunn was denied effective assist-
ance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Ineffective counsel 
prejudiced Mr. Dunn's defense. Absent the errors described 
below, there is probability that the results of Mr. Dunn's 
trial and appeal would have been different sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome. Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 
1023. 
A. Mr. Dunn Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Coun-
sel On His Direct Appeal 
1. The Anders Brief Failed to Adequately Present 
the Issues It Did Raise 
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the 
Supreme Court developed a framework whereby appointed coun-
sel could withdraw from arguing a wholly frivolous appeal. 
Counsel must conform to the following procedure in a proper 
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withdrawal: 
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly 
frivolous/ after a conscientious examin-
ation of it, he should so advise the 
court and request permission to with-
draw. That request must, however, be 
accompanied by a brief referring to any-
thing in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal. A copy of counsel's 
brief should be furnished to the indi-
gent and time allowed him to raise any 
points that he chooses; the court — not 
counsel — then proceeds, after a full 
examination of the proceedings, to de-
cide whether the case is wholly friv-
olous . 
Id. at 744. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 
1981). Anders, however, requires that any issue that is not 
wholly frivolous deserves the advocacy of competent counsel. 
Id.; see also State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 n.2 (Utah 
1986). The Anders brief submitted by Mr. Dunn's appointed 
counsel failed to meet the Anders requirements in several 
respects. 
a. The Anders Brief Improperly Resolved All 
Disputed Fact Issues In Favor Of The 
State. 
The Anders brief submitted in Mr. Dunn's case contained 
a sub-section entitled "Prosecutor's Evidence," in which 
each important factual issue was resolved in favor of the 
State. No attempt was made to justify the arguments with 
record citations or to describe the evidence adduced at 
trial which caused appointed counsel to draw such conclu-
sions. In Robinson v. Black, 812 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1987), 
such an Anders brief was found to be insufficient because 
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counsel, by arguing the government's case, rather than 
sketching out the potential arguments for reversal, failed 
to act as the defendant's advocate, 
b« The Anders Brief Failed To Provide 
Necessary Record Citations And Citations 
To Relevant Case Law. 
It is impossible to determine the merit of the argu-
ments stated in the Anders brief without reading the entire 
trial transcript because, not only did counsel fail to pro-
perly cite to the record, but he also failed to discuss in 
any detail the merits of the issues raised. An Anders brief 
which fails to make adequate record citations or elaborate 
on the possible arguments for reversal is fatally defective. 
United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 365-66 (7th Cir. 
1985) (holding that an insufficient Anders brief was grounds 
for denial of counsel's request to withdraw); see Nell v. 
James, 811 F.2d 100, 103-4 (2d Cir. 1987). While counsel 
did provide some record citations in Mr. Dunn's brief, the 
citations given failed to point out the relevant portions of 
the record with sufficient particularity. Edwards holds 
that an Anders brief must identify the arguably meritorious 
issues, provide record citations and case law relevant to 
them, sketch the arguments for reversal, and explain why 
these arguments are wholly frivolous. 777 F.2d at 366. The 
Anders brief submitted in Mr. Dunn's direct appeal failed to 
meet these requirements. 
One of the issues raised by the Anders brief was the 
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admission into evidence of an unduly prejudicial, inflam-
matory photograph of the victim. No discussion of the legal 
issues pertinent to the admission of this evidence is found 
in counsel's statement of the case, and only two relevant 
cases appear in the section entitled "Points and Applicable 
Law." The brief fails to cite important cases supporting 
Mr. Dunn's contention that the photograph should have been 
excluded, including State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 
512 (1970) (graphic slides depicting the victim during the 
course of the autopsy held in no way probative of the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant and, thus, improperly inflam-
matory ). 
Because Mr. Dunn was not the trigger man, a graphic 
display of a bloody corpse was in no way probative of his 
intent or level of knowledge about the killer's activities 
(the cases cited in the Anders brief did not involve alleged 
aiders or abettors); the same evidence provided by the ad-
mission of the photograph could have been conclusively shown 
by other means. Id. Since the evidence linking Mr. Dunn to 
the crime was primarily circumstantial, the inflammatory na-
ture of the photograph arguably influenced the outcome of 
the case. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1988). Given the availability of these arguments, the issue 
of the admission of the inflammatory photograph was not 
wholly frivolous, see State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 
1986) (it is reversible error to show gruesome photographs 
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absent a showing that evidentiary value outweighed potential 
prejudice), and warranted full and forceful presentation on 
appeal• 
The remaining issues raised in the Anders brief were 
failure to grant the motion to change venue, insufficiency 
of evidence and an illegal search and seizure. At least the 
last of these issues required reversal and is discussed in 
Point II,A,l,c below. For the purposes of satisfying 
Anders, additional treatment in the Anders brief was requir-
ed for each of these issues. While the Anders brief raised 
the change of venue issue, it utterly failed to discuss the 
level of pretrial publicity which made a change of venue 
necessary. Although defense counsel raised the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence claim, he nevertheless failed to 
discuss any of the evidence. This is not the conscientious 
advocacy required by Anders or Clayton. 
c. The Anders Brief Failed Adequately To 
Argue That The Bullets Were The Product 
Of An Unlawful Warrantless Search And 
Thus Should Not Have Been Admitted Into 
Evidence. 
In the Anders brief filed on Mr. Dunn's behalf, counsel 
raised the issue of whether the trial court erred in not 
suppressing evidence of bullets found in Mr. Dunn's belong-
ings. The Anders brief, however, failed to cite favorable 
and relevant case law or to present full argument on this 
issue. The issue was not frivolous and merited argument and 
briefing by counsel. Had counsel adequately done so, it is 
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reasonably probable that the outcome of Mr. Dunn's appeal 
would have been different. 
Most of the State's case against Mr. Dunn rested on 
circumstantial evidence. The evidence showed that the vic-
tim died as a result of two gunshot wounds, and that Mr. 
Dunn's co-defendant, Scott, fired the murder weapon. T. 
494. Mr. Dunn was linked to the crime only through his pre-
sence in the motorhome, and by a bag of bullets which match-
ed the murder weapon and were found in his duffle bag. How-
ever , the bullets should have been suppressed. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within 
narrowly defined exceptions. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
753, 758-60 (1979). To be valid, the search of Mr. Dunn's 
duffle bag must have been undertaken either pursuant to a 
valid search warrant or in circumstances falling within an 
exception to the warrant requirement. The search, however, 
was neither pursuant to warrant nor within any exception to 
the warrant requirement. Thus, the bullets should have been 
suppressed. 
As described above, shortly after his incarceration, 
Mr. Dunn informed Officer Page that he needed prescription 
medicine. T. 280. Mr. Dunn described the duffle bag in 
which the medicine was located and the placement of the 
medicine within the bag. T. 283, P. 121. Officer Page lo-
cated the duffle bag while searching the motorhome, but did 
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not search the bag or remove the medicine from the bag at 
that time. T. 280-81. Instead, Officer Page brought the 
bag to the police station, where it was searched at a later 
time. T. 280-84. 
The search of Mr. Dunn's bag did not fall within the 
ambit of the search warrant, as the warrant obtained covered 
only the motorhome. The execution of a search warrant is 
limited to the specific places described in the warrant and 
does not extend to additional or different places. United 
States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied sub nom., Hubbard v. United States, 456 U.S. 926 
(1982). The search warrant allowed officers to search the 
motorhome and its contents, but once property was removed 
from the premises specified in the warrant, later searches 
of the removed property fell outside the warrant. Taking 
the bag away from the premises specified within the warrant 
removed the power and protection of the search warrant. 
Because the search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag was not 
pursuant to a valid warrant, to be upheld it must fall with-
in one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant 
rule. A warrantless search incident to an arrest may be 
permissible where officers search the arrestee's person and 
the area "within his immediate control." United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977). These searches have 
been held necessary to safeguard the arresting officer and 
to prevent evidence from being concealed or destroyed. This 
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exception has been strictly limited to circumstances where 
necessary to achieve these aims. The "incident to arrest" 
exception will not justify warrantless searches of luggage 
or other property where the search of that property is re-
mote in time or place from the arrest, Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 
15, or where the property is in the control and custody of 
the police and the threat of injury or destruction of evi-
dence therefore no longer exists. See Preston v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search of defendant's car after 
he had been arrested, searched and taken to police headquar-
ters held improper). 
The search of Mr. Dunn's duffle bag cannot be justified 
under the "incident to arrest" exception. The search was 
removed in time and space from the arrest and, Mr. Dunn's 
bag was in the control and custody of the police. At the 
time of the search, Mr. Dunn no longer had access to his bag 
and the search was not necessary for the protection of 
officers or evidence. 
Warrantless searches also may be allowed where subse-
quent to an arrest officers have in their custody property 
of an arrestee and seek to inventory its contents to protect 
an arrestee's property and to protect police from danger and 
accusations of theft or loss. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976). However, an inventory search does not give 
officers unlimited authority to search all personal effects 
of an arrestee, nor can they be used as a subterfuge for 
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police investigation. Id. at 376. Permissible inventory 
searches are very limited with respect to luggage or other 
similar types of personal property where the individual has 
an expectation of privacy. In such instances the police 
have other means of protecting themselves from accusations 
of theft or loss, i.e., they may secure or seal the entire 
suitcase or bag rather than going through its contents. 
Mr. Dunn's duffle bag was property subject to a privacy 
interest. Sanders, 422 U.S. at 762. Police officers easily 
could have secured the bag until they obtained a search war-
rant. Thus, the search of Mr. Dunn's bag was not a permiss-
ible inventory search. 
Warrantless searches may be permissible with consent, 
though the scope of the search will be limited to the actual 
consent given. United States v. Kay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 
(10th Cir. 1985). "Consent to search a specific area limits 
the reasonableness of the search to that area. Any police 
activity that transcends the actual scope of the consent 
given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the sus-
pect." Id. Mr. Dunn did not give the police officers per-
mission to search his bag; he gave them permission to re-
trieve his medicine only, which he instructed them was in 
the bottom of the bag. P. 121. Instead of simply looking 
for Mr. Dunn's medicine at the bottom of his bag, the offi-
cers went through the bag item by item. T. 280-284. Mr. 
Dunn's consent gave the police a limited right to be in his 
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bag; it did not authorize a wholesale search of the bag's 
contents. 
As the police had Mr. Dunn's permission to look inside 
his duffle bag, incriminating evidence in "plain view" may 
have been seized. Nevertheless, seizure of the bullets was 
improper because they were not in plain view. The "plain 
view" doctrine allows police seizure of private property 
where three requirements are met: first, the officer must 
properly be in a position from which he can view the evid-
ence seized; second, the officer must discover the evidence 
inadvertently; and third, the nature of the evidence must be 
either "immediately apparent" or there must be "probable 
cause to associate the property with criminal activity." 
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737-742 (1983); see Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-469 (1971). If the 
bullets were packaged in such a manner that it was apparent 
they were bullets and the police came across them inadver-
tently while reaching in Mr. Dunn's bag to get his medicine 
pursuant to his consent, the discovery of the evidence may 
have fallen under the plain view rule. 
However, as demonstrated by the record, the plain view 
exception is not applicable here. Deputy Page, the officer 
conducting the search, testified as follows: 
A: No. We went ahead with the 
search warrant and then when 
I got ready to leave I just 
picked up the duffle bag which 
was in there, which I had a 
right to go through at that 
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time but I didn't go through 
it, because I did my other 
photographing and everything 
and just brought the duffle 
bag back to the Sheriff's 
Office, 
Q: Now, you say, you had the 
right to go through the duffle 
bag. Now, of course, that's 
what we're deciding. What 
made you think you had that 
right? 
A: Anything — I was searching 
for certain items in there and 
anything that was contained 
within the motorhome, I had 
the right to go into. 
T. 280. Sheriff Huntsman, another officer participating in 
the search, testified as follows: 
A: And we got his duffle bag. He 
said it would be in the bottom 
of the duffle bag. We search-
ed the duffle bag and while we 
were in search for that, we 
ran onto some ammunition, 
twenty-five calibre ammunition 
in the bag. 
P. 121-22. 
This testimony clearly shows that the police were 
searching the entire bag and that the finding of the bullets 
was not inadvertent. The bullets were packaged so that they 
were not immediately apparent or, indeed, apparent at all to 
the police that they had evidence before them. Deputy Page 
testified that one of the first items he found in the duffle 
bag was a small blue bank bag. T. 296. He looked in the 
bank bag, in which there were toiletry articles and a small 
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red bag. Id. Only upon opening the small red bag did he 
find the bullets. Id. As the U.S. Supreme Court has made 
clear: 
. . . the extension of the original jus-
tification is legitimate only where it 
is immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them. 
The "plain view" doctrine may not be 
used to extend general exploratory 
search from one object to another until 
something incriminating at last emerges. 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. 
While the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge 
was modified somewhat in Texas v. Brown, the Court continues 
to require that there be probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity. 460 U.S. at 741-42. Here, 
the officers did not have probable cause to associate the 
property in plain view — a small blue bank bag containing 
toiletry items — with criminal activity, as required by 
Texas v. Brown. Indeed, Deputy Page not only had to open 
the blue bag to discover the bullets, but had to open a 
second bag which also gave no clue as to the identity of its 
contents. 
Deputy Page neither came upon the evidence inadvertent-
ly nor had any probable cause to associate it with criminal 
activity. Therefore, the evidence should have been sup-
pressed. A pretrial motion to suppress was made but erron-
eously denied by the trial court. T. 238, 285-86. The 
failure of the trial court to grant the motion was constitu-
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tional error; that error required briefing and argument on 
Mr. Dunn's direct appeal. 
Defense counsel's failure to make these arguments on 
direct appeal denied Mr. Dunn the effective assistance of 
counsel on appeal. Mr. Dunn's conviction rested primarily 
on circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime. By 
attributing ownership and control of the bullets and, there-
fore, inferentially, the murder weapon to Mr. Dunn, the 
State strengthened considerably the alleged link between Mr. 
Dunn and the crime. Without this evidence, it is reasonably 
probable that the outcome of the case would have been dif-
ferent . 
2. Counsel Failed To Raise Several Meritorious 
Issues On Direct Appeal 
In preparing the Anders brief, Mr. Dunn's counsel was 
obligated to raise and discuss every argument that "a court 
or another lawyer might conceivably think worth citing to 
the appellate court as a possible ground for error." 
Edwards, 777 F.2d at 366. Even though the purpose of an 
Anders brief is to inform and assist the court in determin-
ing whether the appeal is frivolous, counsel is still duty-
bound to act as an advocate on behalf of the petitioner. 
Robinson, 812 F.2d at 1086-87. Otherwise, the defendant 
suffers a denial of the right to due process, id. at 95, the 
appellate procedure violates the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antee of equal protection, Evitts, 469 U.S. at 405, and the 
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defendant is denied the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
The four issues actually raised in the Anders brief 
presented this Court with only a fraction of the possibly 
meritorious issues that should have been argued by competent 
counsel on appeal. Other issues, including improper closing 
argument by the prosecutor, the trial court's reversal after 
Mr. Dunn had taken the stand of its pretrial ruling exclud-
ing Mr. Dunn's prior conviction, and ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial, should have been raised in the Anders 
brief, but were not. These issues are argued in detail 
elsewhere in this brief and it is clear that they are not 
frivolous. 
Appointed counsel's effective preparation of an Anders 
brief is vital to the fundamental fairness of this peculiar 
appellate procedure. See Nell, 811 F.2d at 104. Unless the 
Court is properly informed of the issues on appeal, it is 
unlikely that a convicted defendant will get the benefit of 
the "conscientious" evaluation required by Anders, see 
Robinson, 812 F.2d at 1086-88; Edwards, 777 F.2d at 365; 
particularly where the appellate court is faced with a mas-
sive trial record, with which it is unfamiliar because of 
the deficiencies of counsel. The failure to raise meritor-
ious issues on appeal is a breach of counsel's duty to act 
as an advocate. Robinson, at 1086-88. "The Constitutional 
requirement of substantial equality and fair process can 
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only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active 
advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of an 
amicus curiae." Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. In the case at 
bar, defense counsel played only a passive, ineffective 
role. 
a. The Anders Brief Was Constitutionally 
Deficient Because It Failed To Raise the 
Trial Court's Improper Admission of Mr. 
Dunn's Prior Conviction 
The Anders brief was defective because of the failure 
to raise the substantial issue of the trial court's erron-
eous admission of Mr. Dunn's prior conviction. 
Just before trial, counsel moved to exclude evidence of 
Mr. Dunn's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon 
ensuing out of the abduction of a girl. Trial Ct. File, p. 
94. The prosecutor argued that if Mr. Dunn testified at 
trial, the prior conviction was admissible as impeachment 
evidence. T. 235-36. The trial court reserved ruling on 
the admissibility of the prior conviction for impeachment 
purposes, but clearly stated that it would not admit the 
evidence unless Mr. Dunn put on affirmative evidence of his 
good character. T. 236. The trial court also definitively 
ruled that the prosecutor could not offer the prior convic-
tion as evidence in the State's case in chief. T. 232. The 
court further required the prosecutor to make a motion to 
the court out of the jury's presence before offering evid-
ence of the prior conviction. T. 237-38. 
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In reliance on the trial court's ruling, Mr. Dunn 
elected to testify in his own behalf. His testimony care-
fully avoided any affirmative evidence of good character. T. 
388-445. After direct examination, the prosecution moved to 
admit evidence of Mr. Dunn's prior conviction for impeach-
ment purposes. At this point, the trial court reversed its 
prior ruling and granted the motion with no explanation or 
discussion about why the evidence should now be admitted, 
even though Mr. Dunn's direct testimony had not offered 
evidence of good character. The prosecution then began its 
cross examination of Mr. Dunn with evidence of the prior 
conviction. Defense counsel objected, but was overruled. 
T. 446-48. 
The Anders brief in support of Mr. Dunn's appeal failed 
to raise the issue of the admission of the prior conviction. 
Failure to appeal the admission of that evidence constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. It was a non-frivolous 
issue which should have been appealed. Counsel made a pre-
trial motion to learn whether the trial court would admit 
the prior conviction if Mr. Dunn testified. The court held 
that it would not if Mr. Dunn presented no evidence of good 
character. Accordingly, Mr. Dunn decided to testify but de-
liberately presented no evidence of good character to avoid 
the admission of his prior conviction. Mr. Dunn relied to 
his detriment upon the court's ruling. It was obviously 
improper and prejudicial for the court to change its ruling 
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after Mr. Dunn testified. 
A defendant has the right to a pre-trial ruling on the 
admissibility of prior convictions; State v. Clavo, 520 
So.2d 415 (La. 1987) (case 1); People v. Lytal, 415 Mich. 
603, 329 N.W.2d 738, 740 (1982); at a minimum, the trial 
court should decide admissibility before the defendant takes 
the stand. State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 435 n.3 (N.D. 
1979); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 
357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 854 (1974). The policy underlying these 
decisions is that of fairness to the defendant who must plan 
his trial strategy based upon the court's ruling. A defen-
dant is significantly disadvantaged if he is forced to make 
an uninformed decision of whether to testify. 
Counsel's failure to raise this issue in the Anders 
brief was constitutionally defective. The improper admis-
sion of a criminal defendant's prior convictions is revers-
ible error. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 
1986). The prejudice resulting from that error was com-
pounded in this case because the prior conviction was for an 
offense similar to the one charged. This Court has recogn-
ized that the similarity of a prior conviction to the one 
charged "would be extremely prejudicial and tend to inflame 
the jury. . . . " Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. Had counsel 
raised this issue on appeal there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that this Court would have granted Mr. Dunn a new trial. 
Thus, the error caused substantial prejudice to Mr. Dunn, 
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and the failure to raise the issue on appeal constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
b. The Anders Brief Was Constitutionally 
Deficient Because It Failed To Raise The 
Meritorious Argument That The Prosecu-
tor's Remarks During Closing Argument 
Were Improper and Prejudicial 
During closing argument, the prosecutor made several 
improper, prejudicial remarks. Some of these remarks at-
tempted to infer Mr. Dunn's guilt because he invoked his 
right to counsel: 
[Officer Larson] came up to the vehicle 
and Mr. Dunn told him that this was a 
drive-out vehicle from California. How 
did he appear? Calm, very calm. Then 
what happened? Officer Larson found the 
body and walked up to him and said "What 
can you tell me about the body back 
there?" What does Mr. Dunn say? "I 
want a lawyer. I want a lawyer." Is 
that a frightened man? Is that a man 
that's [sic] so frightened . . . that he 
doesn't know what to do or how to get 
away? "I want a lawyer." (T. 575). 
Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge erroneously 
ruled that this was proper argument. T. 576. Defense coun-
sel failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. 
An attempt by the State to infer guilt from a defen-
dant's exercise of his constitutionally protected right to 
counsel is a denial of that constitutional right and is 
impermissible prosecutorial conduct. Zemina v. Solem, 438 
F.Supp. 455, 465-66 (D.S.D. 1977); State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 
1326, 1328 (Utah 1980). 
The prosecutor's improper argument was not harmless. 
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At trial, Mr. Dunn's only defense was coercion and duress. 
The prosecutor's argument went to Mr. Dunn's state of mind 
and was intended to undermine this defense. The prosecutor's 
improper argument impermissibly compromised constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
182 (1986). 
This Court has held that where proof of an accused's 
guilt is based upon circumstantial evidence, there is a 
greater likelihood that the jury was improperly influenced 
by the prosecutor's remarks. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 
486-87 (Utah 1984). The prejudicial effect of the prosecu-
tor's improper remarks was particularly strong in this case 
as they were made during rebuttal, thus preventing defense 
counsel from challenging the prosecutor's suggestion. Given 
the context in which the prosecutorial remarks were made, 
and the constitutional rights involved, the use of Mr.. 
Dunn's request for an attorney to infer guilt requires re-
versal and a new trial. 
The prosecutor made another improper argument which 
called to the attention of the jurors matters they should 
not have considered. The prosecutor stated: 
and even more important than 
Ernest Sprinkle, Robert Dunn and Howard 
Scott or anyone else, is the impact that 
every jury decision has on the criminal 
system and that's the most important 
factor you need to consider in reaching 
a just and honest decision here today 
because you're going to have to live 
with it and so is society and you are 
all aware of the publicity that sur-
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rounds this case, that surrounds any 
first degree murder case and the impact 
that it has when the jury reaches a 
verdict one way or another. Make sure 
before you determine that there is rea-
sonable doubt, make sure that before you 
elevate some of the concerns to the 
point of a reasonable doubt, that you 
are being fair to the most important 
segment of society at large. 
T. 549. Suggestions that the jury has a duty to convict on 
some basis other than the evidence is improper argument. 
State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (1986). Here, the 
prosecutor suggested that, apart from the evidence before 
it, the jury had an obligation to convict Mr. Dunn based on 
societal concerns. The prosecutor also attempted to stir 
the juror's emotions by suggesting that the victim was not 
afforded twelve jurors to determine whether he should live 
or die. T. 548. These statements were totally outside the 
evidence and were flagrant attempts to inflame the passions 
of the jury. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the jurors were 
"probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching 
their verdict." Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402. In Andreason, 
the record did not contain substantial or independent evid-
ence of defendant's guilt; rather, the State's case relied 
on circumstantial evidence, as was true here. This Court 
held that given those circumstances, the jurors were more 
likely than not influenced by an improper argument and 
therefore reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for 
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a new trial. Id. at 403. 
Despite the prosecutor's improper remarks and their un-
deniably prejudicial effect, defense counsel failed even to 
raise these issues in the Anders brief. The record demon-
strates that defense counsel was aware of the improper na-
ture of at least one of these arguments as he objected to it 
at trial. In similar situations, remarks such as those made 
by the prosecutor in this case have warranted reversal and 
a new trial. That surely constitutes a "probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Archuleta, 
747 P.2d at 1023. Mr. Dunn was thus denied effective as-
sistance of counsel on appeal. 
B. Mr. Dunn Was Denied Effective Assistance Of Coun-
sel At Trial Because Counsel Failed To Request 
Critical Jury Instructions 
The assistance of counsel that Mr. Dunn received at his 
trial was constitutionally defective because of defense 
counsel's failure to request several critical jury instruc-
tions. These omissions prejudiced Mr. Dunn's case suffi-
ciently to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1. Defense Counsel Failed to Request An Appropr-
iate Instruction Regarding Uncorroborated 
Accomplice Testimony 
Mr. Dunn did not pull the trigger. The only evidence 
to support Mr. Dunn's liability as an accomplice was the* 
testimony of his co-defendant, Howard Scott, the trigger-
man. Scott testified that Mr. Dunn knowingly participated 
with Scott in assaulting, binding and shooting the victim. 
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Scott's testimony that Mr. Dunn was his accomplice was not 
corroborated by any other witness or direct evidence. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1982) explains the proper treatment of 
uncorroborated accomplice testimony: 
a. A conviction may be had on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an 
accomplice. 
b. In the discretion of the 
court, an instruction to the 
jury may be given to the 
effect that such uncorroborat-
ed testimony should be viewed 
with caution and such an 
instruction shall be given if 
the trial judge finds the 
testimony of the accomplice to 
be self contradictory, uncer-
tain or improbable.10 
Under a similar federal rule, the Tenth Circuit has 
held that failure to give a cautionary instruction regarding 
uncorroborated accomplice testimony constitutes plain error. 
United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1053 (10th Cir. 1980). 
A general instruction regarding the credibility of witnesses 
is insufficient to inform the jury how to use uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony properly. Id. at 1054. "[I]f the tes-
timony of an accomplice is uncorroborated, 'the court must 
instruct the jury that testimony of accomplices must be 
carefully scrutinized, weighed with great care, and received 
with caution.'" 3x1. at 1053 (quoting United States v. 
10Section 77-17-7 took effect on July 1, 1980 and applied to 
Mr. Dunn's trial which began on December 30, 1980. 1980 Utah Laws, 
ch. 15 § 2. 
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Birmingham, 447 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1971)). 
Scott's testimony was uncorroborated, and § 77-17-7 
clearly applied. However, defense counsel did not request, 
nor did the trial court give, any instruction which speci-
fically cautioned the jury to "carefully scrutinize," and 
"weigh with great care," or "receive with caution" Scott's 
uncorroborated testimony. The only instructions about the 
credibility of witnesses were in insufficient general terms. 
(Trial Ct. File, pp. 122-26). Hill, 627 F.2d at 1054. A 
specific cautionary instruction was important to maintain 
the fundamental fairness of the trial. Counsel's failure to 
request the instruction was professionally unreasonable and 
not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal cases. 
There is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel's error, the jury would not have found Mr. Dunn guilty 
as an accomplice. The only evidence supporting the prosecu-
tion's argument for accomplice liability was the testimony 
of Scott. The lack of a cautionary instruction left the* 
jury unaware of the significance of Scott's bias and inter-
est, which would have significantly detracted from his 
credibility as a witness. Failure to request an instruction 
or to object to the court's failure to give one, substan-
tially prejudiced Mr. Dunn's case and constituted ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. 
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2. Defense Counsel Failed to Request An Appropr-
iate Instruction Regarding Accomplice Liabil-
ity 
Defense counself s failure to request an appropriate in-
struction as to the evidence necessary to establish accom-
plice liability also constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel. An accomplice is one "acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense ... who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids anoth-
er person to engage in conduct which constitutes an of-
fense. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978). A person's 
mere presence, even with the knowledge that a crime is about 
to be committed, does not make the person an accomplice 
unless the person has an intent to join in the crime and 
advises, encourages, or assists in the perpetration of the 
crime. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980); 
State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977); State v. Gee, 
28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (1972). 
In this case, the only instruction given on accomplice 
liability was as follows: 
Under the law of the State of Utah 
every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense, who directly commits the of-
fense or who intentionally aids, soli-
cits, requests, commands or encourages 
another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense, is crimin-
ally liable as a party for such conduct. 
In other words, all persons concerned in 
the commission of a crime, whether they 
directly commit the act constituting the 
offense, or intentionally aid in its 
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commission, are principals in such crime 
and equally liable under the law, 
(Trial Ct. File, p. 136; see Addendum E) (emphasis added). 
This instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to infer 
that Mr. Dunn's mere presence during the kidnapping and 
killing made him a person "concerned in the commission of a 
crime" and thus an accomplice. Reasonably competent counsel 
would have requested an instruction clarifying the prosecu-
tion's burden of producing evidence beyond Mr. Dunn's mere 
presence. Counsel's failure to request an appropriate 
instruction substantially prejudiced Mr. Dunn's case because 
there is a reasonable probability that but for this failure 
the jury would have found him not liable as an accomplice. 
3. Defense Counsel Failed to Request An Appropr-
iate Instruction On the Defense of Compulsion 
Defense counsel's failure to request an appropriate in-
struction on Mr. Dunn's defense of compulsion also consti-
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Dunn testified 
that, at the time the crimes were committed, he was acting 
under compulsion and therefore was not criminally liable for 
his conduct. T. 435-36. Compulsion is an affirmative de-
fense to crimes against the person. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
302(1) (1978). The prosecution carries the burden to prove 
the absence of evidence supporting an affirmative defense. 
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1983). "Clearly, 
a defendant does not bear the burden of persuasion in pre-
senting an affirmative defense. The defendant's evidence 
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need only raise a reasonable doubt as to any element of the 
crime to justify an acquittal." State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 
88, 92 (Utah 1981). 
In State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), this 
Court held that an instruction on an affirmative defense 
which does not explain the prosecution's burden of proof is 
improper because it 
may well raise the inference that the 
burden is on the defendant. The proper 
course would be for the court to explic-
itly state that the defendant has no 
particular burden of proof on the issue 
of withdrawal and that the question is 
whether, taking all the evidence on the 
issue into account, the state has shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant has not withdrawn from the com-
mission of the offense and that he is 
guilty of the offense charged. 
Id. at 429 (Zimmerman, J., with one justice concurring and 
one justice concurring in the result). 
In this case, the trial court's instruction on the de-
fense of compulsion was error. Defense counsel and the pro-
secution each submitted virtually identical instructions on 
compulsion. The court gave the instruction as requested by 
the State, Instruction No. 30, which reads as follows: 
Under the law, an accused person is 
not guilty of an offense if he engaged 
in the proscribed conduct because he was 
coerced to do so by use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force 
upon him, which force or threatened 
force a person of reasonable firmness in 
his situation would not have resisted. 
The defense of compulsion provided 
by this section shall be unavailable to 
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the person who intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly places himself in a situa-
tion in which it is probable that he 
will be subjected to duress. 
If you find under all of the facts 
of this case that the defendant was 
coerced as herein defined, you must find 
him not guilty. 
Trial Ct. File, p. 150; Addendum F. 
Noticeably absent from Instruction No. 30 is any dis-
cussion of the burden of proof. This was the only affirma-
tive defense instructed upon at Mr. Dunn's trial. The in-
struction given for each substantive offense explained that 
the prosecution has the burden of proving each element of 
that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any 
burden of proof explanation in Instruction No. 30 imper-
missibly allowed the jury to infer that Mr. Dunn had the 
burden of proving his affirmative defense. Instruction No. 
30 was reversible error. 
Reasonably competent counsel would have requested and 
objected to the court's failure to give a compulsion in-
struction which clearly explained that the prosecution must 
disprove the defense and that the defendant carries no bur-
den of persuasion. The crux of Mr. Dunn's case from beginn-
ing to end was that he did not willingly participate in the 
crimes. He testified that Howard Scott ordered Mr. Dunn to 
keep quiet and threatened him with a gun. T. 464. A proper 
compulsion instruction was vital to Mr. Dunn's case. It is 
reasonably probable that under a proper compulsion instruc-
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tion the jury would have found that the prosecution did not 
carry its burden of proof and that Mr. Dunn's evidence 
raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt on the substantive 
offenses. Therefore, the failure to request an appropriate 
instruction on the defense of compulsion constitutes inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Dunn was denied effective assistance of counsel 
both at trial and on direct appeal. The Anders brief was 
defective on its face in presenting the issues it did raise 
and it failed to raise several other meritorious claims, in-
cluding, predictably, the ineffective assistance of counsel 
(the author of the Anders brief) at trial. The defects were 
cumulative. 
In these circumstances, invocation of the direct appeal 
rule to dismiss the habeas corpus petition denied Mr. Dunn's 
right to an effective, meaningful appeal. The judgment sum-
marily dismissing Mr. Dunn's petition must be reversed. 
This Court should reverse the conviction and remand for a 
new trial. Alternatively, the petition should be remanded 
to the Third District Court for an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this/7^Tay of j/j£40fc»UlA^ , 1988. T a ^ > g ^ K ^ 
DAVJ 
DEBRA 
CAROLYN COX 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W. DUNN, 
Petitioner 
-v-
GERALD COOK, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C87-4664 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
The above-entitled matter was heard on the 28th day of 
December, 1987, before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy. 
Petitioner was present and represented himself. Respondent 
appeared through counsel, Kimberly K. Hornak, Assistant Attorney 
General. 
The Court, having heard argument and having taken the 
matter under advisement now makes and enters its: 
1. The Court finds that petitioner has raised two 
issues in his post-conviction writ of habeas corpus: 1) whether 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on 
appeal, and 2) whether the selection of the jury was unfair and 
prejudicial. 
2. The Court finds that petitioner's attorney filed an 
Anders brief in the Utah Supreme Court appealing petitioner's 
conviction. The Court additionally finds that petitioner filed 
his own pro se brief in the Utah Supreme Court appealing his 
conviction. 
3. The Court finds that the two issues raised by 
petitioner in his post-conviction writ, ineffective assistance of 
counsel and improper jury selection, could have been raised on 
direct appeal in either petitioner's brief or in the brief filed 
by petitioner's attorney. 
4. The Court finds that petitioner did raise an issue 
on appeal concerning a juror who may have been prejudiced. The 
Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court had to review the 
transcript of petitioner's trial in considering this issue and 
that if any other errors had appeared in the jury selection 
procedure, the Court could have considered such errors sua 
sponte. 
Having made the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
now makes its: 
CQMCLfl£IQM5_.Q£_LM 
1. The Court concludes that the post-conviction writ 
of habeas corpus is not a substitute for a direct appeal. 
2. The Court concludes that all issues raised by 
petitioner should and could h^ rve^  been raised on direct appeal. 
tn *^/>w fit*/ 
DATED this JuL. atty^ of January, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
Third District Court Judge 
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foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Robert W. Dunn, Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, 
this / day of January, 1988. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT W# DUNN, 
Petitioner 
-v-
GERALD COOK, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. C87-4664 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
The above-entitled action was heard on December 28, 
1987 before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Third District Court 
Judge, on respondent's motion to dismiss. Petitioner was present 
and represented himself. Respondent appeared through counsel, 
Kimberly K. Hornak, Assistant Attorney General. 
The Court, having considered the petition and motion to 
dismiss, and having heard argument finds that petitioner could 
and should have raised all issues raised in his post-conviction 
writ of habeas corpus on direct appeal. 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss 
be granted, and the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
, Db 
DATED this /..^  day of January, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
/L-LJ. / 
Honorable Michael R. M 
Third District Court Judg 
ATTEST 
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w 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert Dunn, Box 
250, Draper Utah 84020, this _2_. day of January, 1988. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE StATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
* 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, * BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
ROBERT W. DUNN, 
* Case No. 17571 
Defendant and 
Appellant. * 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged by Information in Sevier County, 
Utah, with the offenses of Murder In The First Degree (UCA 76-
5-202), and with Aggravated Kidnapping (UCA 76-4-302). Counsel 
was appointed, a preliminary hearing and pre-trial hearings 
were conducted, and the case was tried to a jury in January, 
1981. The jury returned guilty verdicts for Murder In The 
Second Degree and Aggravated Kidnapping. At the penalty phase 
of the trial, the jury was unable to agree as to the sentence 
to be imposed. The Court therefore, sentenced the Defendant 
to two concurrent terms in the Utah State Prison of five years 
to life. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Prosecution evidence 
The Defendant, Robert W. Dunn, and one Howard A. Scott, 
became casually acquainted in Southern California probably 
during July or August of 1980. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott were 
both hitchhiking with little specific plan or direction. 
Neither Mr. Dunn nor Mr. Scott had any assets except for nom-
inal personal effects and items of clothing which each carried 
with him. Mr. Scott had few family ties except for a grand-
mother who lived in the eastern part of the country, and Mr. 
Dunn left a common-law wife, apparently with his child, in 
the San Francisco area. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott hitchhiked 
independent of one another to the Barstow, California area, 
but there obtained a ride together with Mr. Ernest 0. Sprinkle,, 
the victim of the homicide in this case. Mr. Sprinkle drove 
a modest sized motorhome, giving Mr. Dunn, Mr. Scdtt and a 
third passenger a ride from Barstow, California to Las Vegas, 
Nevada, where the third passenger alighted and has not been 
seen since. Mr. Sprinkle, Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott paused in 
has Vegas for a few hours, and then continued their journey 
again in the Sprinkle motorhome to Mesquite, Nevada, where 
they again stopped for breakfast and gambling. 
Mr. Sprinkle became somewhat intoxicated in Mesquite, and 
the trio then left with Mr. Dunn driving the motorhome. 
Somewhere between Mesquite, Nevada and Richfield, Utah, 
Mr. Dunn and Mr. Soctt conceived a plan of taking Mr. Sprinkle 
hostage, commandeering the motorhome, taking Mr. Sprinkle to 
Denver, Colorado, where they believed Mr. Sprinkle's wife was 
living, ransom him to her for money, and then abscond with the 
money and the motorhome. Mr. Dunn had a .25 caliber automatic 
pistol with him and had regularly displayed the gun to Mr. 
Scott. In furtherance of the plan, Mr. Scott assaulted Mr. 
Sprinkle and then bound him with rope and placed him in the 
bathroom portion of the motorhome which Was in the rear of 
the vehicle. With Mr. Sprinkle thus beaten and bound, Mr. 
Dunn and Mr. Scott continued on their journey making one or 
two stops prior to reaching Richfield, Utah. At one of those 
stops, both Mr. Dunn and Mr. Scott got ovit of the motorhome, 
and a gasoline purchase was made with money supplied by Scott. 
The journey continued to Richfield, Utah, where a stop 
was made at a gasoline station for the purpose of purchasing 
a fuse for a CB radio in the motorhome. Both Mr. Scott and 
Mr. Dunn again got out of the motorhome and participated in 
the purchase of a fuse from the station attendant. While 
stopped at this service station, Mr. Sprinkle apparently 
gained some consciousness and began to pound on the rear win-
dow of the motorhome, with his hands still tied with the rope, 
and the service station attendant observed such. Mr. Scott 
and Mr. Dunn then hastily left the servide station, proceeding 
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north out of Richfield, with Mr. Dunn driving the motorhome, 
and with Mr. Scott in the rear attempting to again subdue Mr. 
Sprinkle. Unknown to Mr. Scott and Mr. Dunn, the service sta-
tion attendant called law enforcement officials and reported 
his observations. 
A witness, driving a semi-tractor-trailer, followed the 
motorhome from Richfield, to Salina, Utah, a distance of 20 
miles and repeatedly observed Mr. Sprinkle in the rear window 
pounding and apparently calling for some reason unknown to him. 
The witness concluded that something of a drunken party was 
occuring in the motorhome and he was not unduly alarmed. 
A description of the motorhome was received from the 
service station attendant and broadcast to all law enforcement 
officers in the area. A Utah Highway Patrolman observed the 
motorhome in Salina, followed it for some 1 or 2 miles, and 
then turned on his red light indicating the motorhome to stop. 
Upon the stopping of the motorhome, and with the assistance of 
other law enforcement officials who shortly arrived, Mr. Dunn 
and Mr. Scott were arrested and placed in custody. The body 
of Mr* Sprinkle was found in the motorhome, with 2 gunshot 
wounds, an autopsy later indicating that either of said wounds 
was fatal. The .25 caliber automatic pistol was found in the 
motorhome and conclusively shown to have been the murder weapon. 
Additional tests revealed without question that Mr. Scott had 
been the one who fired the weapon in the fatal shooting of Mr. 
Sprinkle. Mr. Scott testified that he and Mr. Dunn became 
alarmed at the activity of Mr. Sprinkle at the service station 
in Richfield and that Mr. Dunn suggested and encouraged the 
shooting of Mr. Sprinkle. 
Defense Evidence 
Defendants version of the facts is essentially the same 
as that of the prosecution until the point in time of the as-
sault of Mr. Sprinkle by Mr. Scott. Defendant contends that 
this assault was spontaneous on the part of Mr. Scott, and 
that he, the Defendant, was taken greatly by surprise at it. 
The gun in question was produced by Mr. Scott, the Defendant 
not having any prior knowledge of it, and as Mr. Scott assaulted 
and bound Mr. Sprinkle, he indicated to Mr. Dunn that his life 
was likewise in danger. Thus, Mr. Dunn became every bit as 
much of a hostage of Mr. Scott as was Mr. Sprinkle, and he 
drove the motorhome under the direction and threats of Mr. 
Scott. 
When the stop was made for the gasoline purchase, Mr. 
Dunn considered the possibility of an escape attempt, but 
because he believed that Mr. Scott continued in possession of 
the gun, that he could not escape without risking his life or 
the life of the attendant at the station where the gasoline 
was purchased. 
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When the parties again stopped at a service station m 
Richfield, Mr. Dunn again considered the possibility of an 
escape, but because Mr. Scott maintained a close proximity 
to him at all times, Mr. Dunn determined to forego an effort 
at escape because of fear of his life and for fear of other 
persons in the area. Mr. Dunn drove the motorhome as it left 
the service station in Richfield at the express command of Mr. 
Scott. Mr. Dunn did so only in morbid fear of Mr. Scott, think 
ing that he would be killed at any moment. When Mr. Scott fire 
the fatal rounds in killing Mr. Sprinkle, Mr. Dunn was only 
further placed in fear of his life and only continued to drive 
the motorhome because of that great fear and coercion by Mr. 
Scott. 
As the motorhome entered Salina, Mr. Dunn determined to 
attempt to attract the attention of the Trooper by waving his 
hand out the window, but was unsuccessful in that effort. When 
the motorhome was finally stopped, Mr. Dunn immediately got out 
greatly relieved that he now had some protection against the 
vicious nature of Mr. Scott, and attempted to explain to the 
officers his status as a hostage of Mr. Scott. In summary, 
Mr. Dunn never planned or conceived of any crime either alone, 
or jointly with Mr. Scott, his only involvement in the events 
being that of the driver of the motorhome, and then he did such 
driving only because of Mr. Scott's threats and possession of 
the gun. 
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POINTS AND APPLICABLE L^W 
1, Did the t r i a l court err in denying Defendant's motion 
for change of venue. 
UCA §77-35-29 
State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40 P.2d 961 
State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P.2d 973 
2, Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence a 
photograph of the body of the victim. 
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
 r,, -> 
State v. Rinzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 n t o3 
State v. Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 454 P-2d 290 
Trial transcript, Page 227 
3, Did the trial court err in not suppressing evidence 
of bullets removed from Defendant's personal belongings. 
CooLidqe. v> Hew Hampshire, 4Q3 U»S» 443* 
91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed2d 564 (1971) 
United States v. Dunavan, 485 F2d 201 
(6th Cir. 1973) 
Floyd v. State, 24 Md.App. 363, 330 A.2d 677 (1975) 
Lipovich v. State, 265 Ark. 55, 
576 SW2d 720 (1979) 
State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651(1972) 
State v. Houser, 21 Wash.App. 20, 584 P.2d 410 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 210, 
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed2d 854 (1973) 
United States v. Mendenhall, 64 L.Ed2d 497, 
100 S.Ct. 1870, reh den 65 L.Ed2d 1138, 
100 S.Ct. 3051 
Trial transcript, Pages 277-286 
4, Was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict 
•f the jury. 
State v. Coffev. 564 P.2d 777 
state v. Erickson, 658 P.2d 751 
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State in the Interest of S M-
584 P.2d 914 
State v, Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARCUS TAYLOR (J ^ 
LABRUM & TAYLOR 
108 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 896-6484 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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PRO SE BRIEF 
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Of Utah 
Plaintiff aw! 
Respondent9 
Robert W. Dunn 
Defendant and 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal frea the judgment of the sixth Judicial District Court, 
in and for Serier County, Utah. (Honorable Don V. Tibbe, Judge) 
Robert Farrish; 
Office of t he Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt lake C i ty , Utah 64114 
Attorney For Respondeat 
Robert ''•'. Dunn 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
6 f c F 0 * * A>i6. T * h l S ^ — " n**1 '* 
. W ^ 
FEB 191982 
Cbrk C ^ . W.k 
S&*'0&i<*£A.. &*-C*^^*y~- C^^t&r^ 
Se/z. c//"<. Y ^Ht^^' eS <-**£/ y£-
Fa** 14 Lines 28-29 
My B U I 1» Den V. Tibbs, I knew many of you personally. 
frge 17 Lin«« 2-3 
As there is only 250 working days a year. 
Page 18 Lines 2*3 
This aattsr and ths complaining witness in this ease is Rex rtiiasman, 
(he i s ths eeunty sheriff) but on page 240 Lines 15-19, at this time 
we'll ask ths clerk to read the information or the amended information. 
The elerkt in the tenth circiut court state of Utah, Sevier county, 
state of Utah, Pxainiff t Howard A. Scott vs/ Robert V;. Dunn, amended 
information ease. 
fags 8* U P « 7-9 
Mrs* Astria B. wenson your married 1 assuae. r*ge 33 Lines 1-5 the court 
and what i s your wifes name? I2r. Gates s Del ma the court t ItM glad you 
did'nt say Jean'beeause I'd be in real trouble, rage 49 lines 28-30 
ever to rage SO Lines 1-2 Mr. l'erry Nora felt I don't knew , I think 
all of us hare. The court» no, NO, just be earefull want to know- I don t 
want anything that I don't want to hear. "Was excused" 
Page 65 Lines 3-7 
Kr*. Marie Blackett: Being a e.m.t. I do hare a scanner and I'r aware 
of what happend that day and — the court t No, no, as I said there are 
•any things that hare happend, "Was a Juror" All tht jurors are from 
Richfeild Page 101 Line* 28-29 and theres just so many of you that I 
can't take you al l out for luneh to your just on your own. Page 197 
Lines 6-8 I hare to keep you together and that will be the procedure 
1*11 try in every m»y possible to make this experience a delight to 
you and I thing you'll enjoy i t . Line 10 at this time your excused 
until tomorrow. Page 139 Lines 23-27 Well Xguess i t would depend on 
the crime and how 2 fe l t , You know, if I listened to the jury."Q" 
do you think you could l isten to all of the evidence? Was excused. 
Page 219 Line the eourtt I don't want to do this."the eourt don't 
want to lock the jury up" rmge 239 Linee 13-18 I thought maybe We'D 
just mention this to you can kind of juggle or adjust. Page 246 Lines 
19915 tarn state first of al l dees not allege that lir. Dunn shot the 
victim, Howard Scott shot the victim. Page 247 Linee 6-12 The D.A. 
The first stipulation i t that of the deceaseds wife krs. Sprinkle, 
the would testify that she last saw her husband on the evening of 
August 12 and that she returned home from work on August 13 to find 
the mobile home gone, her husband gene, and no indication that he had 
left to go to Denver to see his brother and to trr to find omtloyment 
Page 249 - 250 Lines 16-30 over to lines 1*3 the D.A. your honor, 
the first item of evidence is the stipulation between the state and 
the defense concerning the testimony of Urs. Sprinkle, we would 
reouest the eourt read this into the reoardv the eourtt l>s. Uargret 
Sprinkle of Onterio Calif, i f called te teetify would state substantially 
ae follows (1) that the i t the wife of the deceased victim in th is natter 
Earnest Sprinkle. (2) that she lawt saw earnest Sprinkle al ive on the 12th 
day of August I960 at the Sprinkle residence in Calif
 f (3) that upon returning 
from work on Aug. 13th she found a notp from Mr. Sprinkle indicating that 
he was going to drive to Denver to v i s i t with his brother*and seek employment. 
Page 254 Lines 2-4 Q when he whistled and waved hie hand, what did you take 
that to seen ? "Ah I eought a ride" Exhibit "A" Page 3 Unas 4-7 told officers 
he had no idea why he had been summoned by the suspects to some to the station* 
Page 255 Lines 3-9 Page 256 Lines 29-30 "Q" Do you recall the exact words that 
he eaid "A1* As near as I can remember he said, I want a lawyerf a l l I wes told 
to do was drive Exhibit "A" Page 2 of 3 eec 14 l ines 4-5 Quickly in and 
ordered Dunn to get out of here . Page 280 l ines 15-30 "Over" "QM now did you 
go over there pursant to the search war rent and obtain the duffle bag or did 
you get the duffle bag before doing your search under the warrent? "A" No we 
went ahead with the eeareh warrant and then I got ready to leave I Just picked 
up the duffle bag which was in there
 9 which I had the right tc go through at 
but I did ,nt go through i t . Because I did my photographing and everything and 
just brught the duffle bag back to the sheriffs office. "Q" now you say you 
had to go thruogh the duffle bag now ofcourse that's what we*re deciding. 
What made you think you had the right? "A" anything — I was searching for 
certain items in there and anything that was wontained within the motor home 
"A" Yes MQ" You personaly did that? "A" Yes "Q" Did you look in the duffle bag? 
while i t was in the motor homelet Salina "A" No "Q" So you brought the dufflv 
bag back to the shefiffs office before you went through it? "A" Yes Same page 
l ines 15-30 rvw page 282 l ines 1-5 l ines 10-22 page 283 l ines 23-29 "Q" You 
did fnt hear Scott t e l l where the bul l i t s were at? "A" No I never saw Vr. Duna 
unti l after I returned1 to the j a i l . Fage 284 l ines 7-22 page 285 l ines 4-5 of 
the home and the duffle bag because of a defective warrant and affidavit . 
l ines 10-30 over l ines 1-2 page 282 l ine 30 over l ine l f 2 t 3 . th is ease had 
never produced Mr. Sprinkles wallet , has i t? "A" Not to my knolage "Q" you 
know that i t has'nt don't you? "A" Yee. page 109 l inee 28-30 over l ines 1-5 
and l ine 14 "Q" and ae you were swabbing or preparing to swab the hands of 
Ur. Scott he asked to talk to you; did'nt he? "A" Yee we had eome conversation. 
"Q" and he began to talk about the circumstances and events of the crime; 
did'nt he? "A" No. I don't belive he mentioned anything about the crime to 
me. 
Dec* 31st. 2:00am Richfeild f Utah. Page 314 looking a* the yer. weere on 
Dec*30 1980. Jan 1981 page 521 l ines 14-17 back to page 197 l ines 6-8 
m running a conciderable riek by allowing you to go home and I would'nt 
normally do i t except I know the type of people that you are and I know 
that you wi l l follow my instructions. Jan 5 1981 page 526 l ines 1 8 - 3 
instucted 21 or 25 or 24 l ines 2-3-4 page 581 l inee 11-19 Motion for mistrial 
page 590 l inee 1-9 page 613 l ines 3-4 "Jury" you may new leave the court 
room whereupon the Jury l e f t the court room "Did not leave" 
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5. ISSUES PRESENTED BT THB APPEAL. 
A* Appellant fi led a pre-trial Ifotion for change of 
Venue, supported br evidence showing pre6trial publicity, said 
Motion was denied« and Appellant elaime error therefor* 
B. During the course of t r ia l (transcript, page 227 
l ine 14 to page 228, l ine 2) the prosecution offered, over Appellant's 
objection, a photograph of the body of thfe rictigu "/Apellant contented 
that said photograph was inflammatory to the jury* 
C. The court received evidence of a prior felony conviction 
of Appellant over hie objection (transcripts, page 443, l ine 23 to page 
447 l ine 30). Appellant contends that the court erred in admitting 
evidence of the prior felony beyond the date, place and name of the 
crime. 
D# Appellant assigns as error the admission over his ob-
jection of Exhibit 8. Appellant contends that the Exhibit which 
contained something of a brief"rhywe"f was immaterialf irrevelant, 
inflammatory and prejudicial (eee transcript, page 466, l ine 23 to 
page 471f l i ne 5 ) . 
E« Appellant alee claims as error the admission of a card 
which had the phraee written en i t of 'Drifter BoB? Appellant 
contented that eald Exhibit was hereeay and that i t wae admitted 
without proper foundation (transcript, page, 471, l ine 17 to page 472, 
lime 29), 
P# Appellant further claims the general insufficiency of 
the evidence to eustain a conviction* 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS September 3, I98O 
Tine 11,1*0 A.M. 
CRIMINAL #178 (COPY) 
Page h line 6-11 that unlove there has been a 
ahowing of •one aort of probable cause or showing 
that he has, in fact, committed some crime, of other, 
the court would be without jurisdiction to proceed, 
and in fact, the District court would be without any 
grounds for odering a thirty day commitment. 
"TRANSCRIP" Dec 30, I98O 
The D.A's opening statements, page 2I4.6 line 
13,lU,l5 the state. 
First of all, does not allege that Mr. Dunn 
ahot the victim. Howard Scott shot the victim, page 
323 line 25 to 30* "My Attorney" Looking....Your 
Honor, at count 1, the murder count, the mental in-
tent of intentionally or knowingly causing the Death, 
etc. The state didn't show any intent or the knowing 
element on the part of the defendant; as to the act-
ual cause of death of the victim. I think its clear 
that it shows that the defendant did not cause the 
death, he did not pull the trigger, he didn't tie the 
victim up, and he didn't put him in the bathroom. 
2. Therea been no evidence to show that the defend-
ant struck the victim, tied him up, put him 
in the bathroom, or pulled the trigger. Theres no 
evidence to show that then© was a common plan, or a 
scheme, nor a eonspracy between the two defendants 
regarding that. Just an absence of evidence showing 
that Mr. Dunn, aa far as his physical lnvolvment, as 
far aa his aantal state, and the same thing would be 
there aa to the kidnapping, the force displayed agai-
nst the Body of the victim. Theres no evidence that 
Mr. Dunn exercised any force. Therea been no evid-
ence Mr* Dunn made any threats, theres been no evid-
ence that Mr. Dunn Inflicted any bodily harm or did 
anything to terrorize the victim; theres no evidence 
that Mr. Dunn robbed the victim and theres no evid-
ence that he had the mental stste required to supp-
ort that count of the information, 
(page 6 lines 1 to 12, 19 on) 
3. Transcript sept 3, I960; 
Lawyer: Motion 1, to dismiss for insufficiency 
of process aa the atate code, ia baaed in particular 
/"• 1 or the new Rules of criminal procedure, 4B, 6A, and 
M M J f 7A4rif )• My contention is that-in. paa sage of the new 
criminal code it was the intent that were an* arrest 
is made without warrant stating probable cauae, that, 
in fact, the information or some document attached 
there shows proballe cause to give the magistrate or 
the court acting as preliminary examination court the 
jurisdiction over the defendant to hold him, in fact, 
for preliminary examination; Rule i+B lines 19 to &0 
over "Lawyer: the aecond aentence of Rule kB reads 
that, "an information may contain or be accompanied 
by a statement of facts sufficient to make up proba-
ble cause to sustain the offense charged where app-
ropriate,11 and it is my contention that the words, 
Iwhere appropriate,19 were added to cover a situation 
much as we had here where we don't have an arrest 
warrant ahowlng probable cause, and therefore, where 
the defendant appears in court, there is no need for 
probable cause which must be shown sufficient to hold 
the defendant for preliminary examination; 
Rule 6A, the second paragraph of Rule 6A, talks 
about upon the filing of an information if it appears 
from the information or any affidavit filed with the 
information that there la probable cause and the mag-
la trate shall cause either a warrant or a summons, as 
the case may be, and its my contention that in 6A, its 
in opposition to kB and its 1*3 thata supposed to cover 
the situation where you don9t have an arrest warrant 
showing probable cause, and therefore, it must be in 
the information itself; Rule 7A, sub k$ (;;) indica-
tes that the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense charged shall, upon the defendant's first 
apparance before him, inform the defendant (;;) of 
any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support 
of the information, and how he May obtain the same* 
At thia point we haven't had, as Z understand it, 
any showing to the court of any affidavit or statem-
ent to show probable cauae, that, in fact, the def-
endant has committed the crime, that haa been charged, 
the reason Z think that the new rules contemplate 
probable cause la that prior to the enactment of the 
new rules we had the deciaion of Oeratein vs. Pugh 
out of the United Supreme Court in 1975 which mandate, 
in my view, that la perpetration of the Utah rules# 
Oeratein required, in my view, that there be an 
immediate ahowlng of probable cause as soon as poss-
ible prior to a preliminary examination over the body 
of the defendant for the purposes of prelimanary 
examination* 
Z will dlaeuss that fase further in connection 
with motion #2* But Z think that aince that la the 
supreme law of the land at the time of the enacting 
of thoae rules that they ought to be interperted, 
the Utah rules of rules that they ought to be inter-
preted* The Utah rulea of criminal procedure ought 
to be Interpreted to be consistent with Gersteln vs, 
Pugh# 
mj u«f ox vnat is that we don't have on the 
Information Itself any probable cause taction other 
than the conolusionary atatement by the sheriff 
that the Information la based upon evidence obtain-
ed from witnesses* 
We don't know what witnesses eaw, what infor-
mation from which witness, and basically it'a a 
oonolusory statement that has lead the sheriff to 
believe there is probable cause, and yet no court-
It doesn't give the magistrate any basis for 
review to determine if, in fact, there was probable 
oause* 
Oh* if I were to surmise what the witness may 
have said, and I have some insight on that based 
information, I think all the Information, at least 
the facts that the prosecutor has represented to me, 
and las given mer. and I have no reason 
to doubt it, and has given me all the info he has but, 
basically It ahould state something as follows; 
"That this information is based upon the state-
ment," or "That the complainant states that he has 
talked to a Michael Stotts and Mr. Stolts told him 
that on the llith day of august, on such and such a 
date, In the county, he personally obaerved both Def-
endants and a man having, baaed on the atatement of 
Bud Larsen that he was a truck driver* 
*©* to done these days on every federal infor-
mation by the rules of the federal rules of procedure* 
Now, its either J4B or $B and whichever one it 
is,, escapes me at that point, but the case law bas-
ically states that that sort of probable cause is 
the same sort of probable cause which is required on 
a warrant or in the information, if it isn't on a 
warrant, that would be necessary for a search warr-
ant and In order to do that, we have to know who the 
witnesses were and if they personally saw it, or if 
it isn't baaed on hearsay, or whatever, and I think 
the informations in this eaae doesn't give up that 
basis for review* 
Motion 2, li made really Independent of the rules 
themselves baaed upon the fact that there has been no 
probable cause shown on the face of this warrant, or 
at any other time up until now sufficient to hold this 
defendant for trial, or for any other further proceed-
ings* 
«* W*V.AO A ivcbion A or the constitution which is 
really a foundation Article which talks in terms of 
liberty or anything else being the exception. 
Article X, Section 7 of the Utah constitution 
basloally statea that life and liberty will not be 
taken only by due process of law, and we're talking 
here in my estimation at this time about procedures, 
due process, and that's my statement to motion 2; 
Article I, section lit of the constitution of 
Utah is the equivalent of amendment k and very briefly 
we're talking about the right of people to be secure 
in their persons and no warrant ahall issue, but upon 
probable cause, etc, so we're not talking about in 
Article IV with regards to homes, but we're talking 
in regards to procedure of a person in this case, 
I have one other amendment to make, but the 
motion on sub (e) should read amendment k of the con-
stitution of the United states• Amendment XIV, sec-
tion I of the constitution of the United states talks, 
of course about, procedural due process and amendment 
k talks about the right again of persons to be secure 
In their homes* 
My base ease with regards to motion #2 is the 
Oernsteln vs. Pugh case and in the atate of Flordla 
it la customary where an information or a complaint 
was signed, "There was no showing of probaftle cause 
prior to the time of trial itself and the Gemstein 
ease haa uaed those facts so far as it violates the 
fourth amendment and concluded that, in fact, it is a 
violation of the fourth amendment to the United states 
Constitution," and if I might read from the supreme 
court reporter, 95 tup, ct, page 863 in the Gernstein 
case and it really follows the situation we have here 
where a policeman makes an on the aecene assessment 
of probable eause and makes an arrest with process and 
it quotes as follows; 
"Under this practical compromise, the policeman's 
on the scene assessment of probable cause provides 
legal Justification for arresting a peraon suspected 
of a crime and for a brief period of detention to take 
the administrative steps incident to arrest. 
Ex rel Culle and Cullen G. oecci, 1970 Wisconsin 
ease found at 178 HW2d 175 s Wisconsin supreme court 
relied on the Wisconsin constitution Article I, section 
Z found on 180- article I, section lit of the constitu-
tion of the state of Utah* 
Violation again, Article I of the constitution 
of Utah Article 1, section 7, Article Isect 12, Article 
XIV from due process of MI amendment 6 of Untlted States 
sub-title (e)t 
ADDENDUM E 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
INSTRUCTION NO. /7 
Under the law of the State of Utah, every person, 
acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense, who directly commits the offense or who intentionally 
aids, solicits, requests, commands or encourages another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense, 
is criminally liable as a party for such conduct. In other 
words, all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, 
whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, 
or intentionally aid in its commission, are principals in 
such crime and equally liable under the l^w. 
ADDENDUM F 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JU 
INSTRUCTION « w >_^ 
TTnHf -. > - - y 
;
 .- vis coercec do so se r threatened "'eminent 
nnu, II 
f o r c e d p e r - r e a s o n a b l e f i r m n e s s LI, rii: iLudl .nu A. .Id 
not have r e s i s t e d . 
s h a l l be un.i ma i l ab l e :c p e r s o n who i n t e n t l o n a l 1 - -w r:gly 
or r e c k l e s ? 1 ^ - 1 - > - - - l •> c , nH ^ t - ' i ^ r i^ r •
 4ll «rij.wu i t i s 
probable tn.:. 
:.v?e: -1 : the I.JCLI; f this case 
that the Defendant was coerced as herein defined, you must 
f ind h im no 1: gu I "1 ty 
